But the Covid-19 pandemic and the consequent economic shock make the argument for a significant extension overwhelming. The question is how to make the wise course of action also the politically expedient and feasible one.
The UK now has the highest number of deaths from the Covid-19 pandemic of any country in Europe, and daily rates continue much higher than in the other high-mortality countries. As the UK continues to perform markedly worse than comparators, the clamour for focused action will intensify. Clearly, bringing down the death rate and ultimately cautiously reopening the economy are the highest—arguably the only--priorities.
Any government would struggle to handle both the pandemic and the Brexit negotiations at the same time, and the current government was discombobulated by Johnson’s absence during his sickness (and his earlier holiday). Tackling the pandemic cannot wait; in contrast, the Brexit timetable is entirely artificial. Therefore, the end of the transition period should be put back by four years.
The reasons are manifold: First, Johnson needs to show that he is now fully engaged in trying to minimize the loss of life from the pandemic; if he is seen instead wrangling with EU negotiators this will indicate that he has his eye off the ball. The shambles under which the UK failed to join the EU medical equipment procurement initiative either because of Brexit ideology or because of not reading EU emails (it is actually likely to have been both, and they are the same thing) has cost lives, and should be a warning. Second, it is possible that in these emergency times he might find some use for the EU—such as for joint medical equipment procurement, given continued shortages in the UK and the continued high mortality rate. Third, some of the concomitants to Brexit now look misguided and indeed unpalatable: there is unlikely to be a majority in the country to deny work to the two nurses who looked after Johnson during his illness—a central part of the Patel proposals. A first positive sign of realism in the government was the decision to postpone the Second Reading of the Patel immigration bill. It will need a total re-think. There are also reports that the UK is now seeking a close relationship with the European Pandemic Warning Response System. . Fourth, Brexit negotiations are complex, and need properly to be handled face-to-face. Virtual meetings are fine up to a point, but only up to a point, and there is little prospect that face-to-face meetings with full teams involved could be feasible over the coming months.
Meanwhile, the economic case for postponement is strong. It is possible that in a healthy growing world economy Brexit Britain might not have done too badly (it is all relative). The world economy at the end of 2020, however, is likely to be in its deepest depression since the 1930s: it will be on the proverbial life support. There is no realistic prospect that under such circumstances Britain would be anything but struggling. And for no foreign government would talk with the UK to arrange trade deals be their highest priority: they will need to handle their own pandemic and pandemic-related issues. Exiting the Brexit transition at that point would be like making yourself homeless at a time when there is a stay-at-home order in place.
So, why four years? Politically, any postponement will infuriate a certain group of Conservatives. Johnson will hear noise on his backbenches, and maybe a resignation or two from his front-bench. But he can survive them, and in any case may well face exactly the same opposition if he postpones for four minutes rather than four years. Johnson needs four years, since the handling of the pandemic will not be over quickly. Thereafter his two priorities will be to re-build the NHS and work out how to honour the heroism of those at present “in the front lines” in the NHS—he will need to find a modern equivalent to the “homes fit for heroes” pledge after the First World War--- and to carry out his commitment to build infrastructure to re-vitalize the north of England, so as to keep the seats that he won in 2019. Demands on the government’s attention for these areas will be all-encompassing and performance in them likely to determine the result of the next election. And by 2024 the world economy will hopefully have recovered, and post-transition economic performance likely will be stronger than at the end of the current year. Those circumstances will greatly facilitate negotiations with EU and non-EU partners on trade and other matters.
What would Johnson need from the EU to get its agreement for the four-year transition? There is unlikely to be much problem. For the EU too the last thing it needs at this time is the extra turbulence of a no-deal Brexit. The main concession that Johnson would need in order to be able to make productive use of the extra time would be to get a 4-year exemption from EU state aid rules, so that he can carry out his envisaged restructuring of the UK economy. While state aid prohibitions used to be a key EU competency, this is now not the case. The Commission has already given exemptions to governments seeking to combat the effects of the pandemic through giving aid to particular companies or sectors. It is unlikely that there would be much fundamental opposition to the UK on this, though some conditions would be applied. Indeed, the UK might find itself in broad company as other countries seek temporary waivers from the rules in order to build their economies; there might even be a general waiver.
Brexiteers might shout that this is a last-ditch effort by Remainers to keep the UK effectively in the EU. Maybe so, but from the Brexiteer point of view, except for those who have positioned themselves to make money out of a hard Brexit, they will wish to make a success of Brexit: leaving the transition now would much reduce the likelihood of achieving it. A botched Brexit is likely to imperil the continuation of the United Kingdom, which some Brexiteers purport to care about.
It is also the case that the EU in four years will likely look very different from now. On the one hand, perhaps there will be progress towards the super-state, along the lines of the proposals of President Macron. Then the Brexiteers will likely have additional support for their position to leave. On the other hand, a more flexible EU may have emerged. For instance, Thomas Wieser[1], former Chair of the Eurogroup, has proposed that the EU split its functions into a number of buckets, and countries could choose in which of the buckets they wish to belong; the EU itself would be an over-arching umbrella. Wieser’s proposed buckets (monetary/fiscal, border, immigration, defence, climate change) might be supplemented by medicine and health. In such an event Johnson might find that he prefers to stay in, taking an à la carte approach as to which buckets the UK would wish to be in.
Initiating an extension would leave domestic opposition parties and European counterparts flat footed. Such pragmatism is not expected from the current Conservative Party. It is hard to see how the Labour Party and the other parties could put up any resistance.
Would Johnson have the flexibility to seek an extension? His party history indicates a tentative yes. The Conservative party was essentially created by Sir Robert Peel in the 1830s; his most memorable action was reversing his position on the Corn Laws, one of the most iconic moments in British parliamentary history. Then came Benjamin Disraeli, who sponsored the Second Reform Bill and a wealth of social legislation, paving the way for 20 years of Conservative hegemony from the 1880s. And finally, Johnson’s hero, Winston Churchill, not only changed policies, but twice changed parties. Johnson would not have to do anything so extreme if he proposed a 4-year transition extension; he would just be recognizing economic, social, humanitarian, and political desiderata.
#Brexit; #Covid19; #CharlesEnoch
Charles Enoch
ESC Fellow, European Political Economy Project, European Studies Centre, St Antony’s College, University of Oxford[2]
[1] Max Watson lecture, June 24, 2019, St. Antony’s College, Oxford.
[2] I am grateful to Daniel Hardy for comments.
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